by Damozel | Ali Soufan, an F.B.I. supervisory special agent from 1997 to 2005, says in a "must read" New York Times op-ed:
One of the most striking parts of the memos is the false premises on which they are based. The first, dated August 2002, grants authorization to use harsh interrogation techniques on a high-ranking terrorist, Abu Zubaydah, on the grounds that previous methods hadn’t been working...
It is inaccurate, however, to say that Abu Zubaydah had been uncooperative. Along with another F.B.I. agent, and with several C.I.A. officers present, I questioned him from March to June 2002, before the harsh techniques were introduced later in August. Under traditional interrogation methods, he provided us with important actionable intelligence....
There was no actionable intelligence gained from using enhanced interrogation techniques on Abu Zubaydah that wasn’t, or couldn’t have been, gained from regular tactics. In addition, I saw that using these alternative methods on other terrorists backfired on more than a few occasions — all of which are still classified. The short sightedness behind the use of these techniques ignored the unreliability of the methods, the nature of the threat, the mentality and modus operandi of the terrorists, and due process....
It was the right decision to release these memos, as we need the truth to come out. This should not be a partisan matter, because it is in our national security interest to regain our position as the world’s foremost defenders of human rights. Just as important, releasing these memos enables us to begin the tricky process of finally bringing these terrorists to justice.
My C.I.A. colleagues who balked at the techniques, on the other hand, were instructed to continue. (It’s worth noting that when reading between the lines of the newly released memos, it seems clear that it was contractors, not C.I.A. officers, who requested the use of these techniques.) (More....; emphasis added)
Melissa McEwen remarks:
At some point, I hope there's a reckoning for the influence private military contractors were allowed to have on our national policy during the Bush administration. I hope, but I suspect there won't be.
In fact, I suspect that outsourcing the really ugly stuff was the point all along.
Jane Hamsher says:
Paul Kelley says that whether torture produced actionable intelligence is irrelevant and not a question we should be considering:
Torture is immoral and unspeakable under any circumstances. It's efficacy shouldn't even be considered. Why am I such an absolutist about this? Because once we torture we lose our soul. There is nothing left to fight for after that, no brutality that will not be considered or implemented. We are either civilized, enlightened human beings or we are not.
Ron Beasley points out that we prosecuted the Japanese for waterboarding after WWII. "If it was illegal then it is illegal now."
Marcy Wheeler asks:
Larisa Alexandrovna says:
Yet in all of this, the key
question remains unanswered. Why did we torture people? The Bush
administration knew torture did not work. They knew that torture
provided no actionable intel. Why do it then? What was the objective in
this policy? (emphasis added)
Andrew Sullivan answers:
RELATED BUCK NAKED POLITICS POSTINGS
Fresh Evidence that Bush Administration Approved Torture as Early as 2002; Meanwhile, Obama Walks Back "No Accountability" Policy
Pelosi Now Recalls Being Briefed on Harman Wiretap; Harman Launches Media Blitz, Trips Up Badly (Round Up)
Colbert on Fire: Obama's "Just Following Orders" Argument
Jon Stewart on Fire: "We Don't Torture"
Hillary Smacks Down Cheney (& Dana Rohrbacher)
Did Torture "Work"? Does that Matter, and are They Telling the Truth?
McCain: Waterboardings "Unacceptable" ("Waterboarding is Torture, Period")
Updated: Did the Bush Administration Condone Torture? (Warning: horrifying details included)
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